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Credit Rationing and Real Assets: Evidence 






This  paper  investigates  empirically  the  role  of  real  assets  in  credit 
rationing. When loans are collateralized, the amount borrowed is determined 
by the value of collateral. This happens because in a context of asymmetric 
information banks use real assets as a guarantee in the case of project's default. 
Although many papers have explained the relationships between the debt level 
and  the  value  of  real  assets,  empirical  evidence  is  mainly  based  on  large 
“listed” firms. The question as to the whether these arguments are valid for 
smaller firms has received limited attention. 
Many papers also show that specialized assets should fetch a low resale price. 
This  suggests  that  a  high resale  price corresponds to  a  highly  redeployable 
asset and that the reduction in resale value aggravates credit rationing, so that 
investment declines. 
My purpose is to show empirically how the value of real assets explains credit 
rationing of Italian small and medium firms. It is interesting to analyze small 
and  medium  firms  because  of  their  ownership  structure  and  size  they  have 
fewer financial options. Large firms can obtain credit on the public markets 
while small firms depend on financial intermediaries. This implies that their 
main  source  of  funds  is  banks.  These  firms  are  more  likely  to  face  credit 
rationing or very high cost of non collateralized debt because banks resolve 
asymmetric  information  by  charging  higher  interest  rates  or  collateral 
requirement on small firms.   3




The present work is aimed to study the relationship between fixed assets and 
credit rationing and the effect of public subsidies on credit rationing. 
In the first part, the paper investigates empirically the relationship above. 
The analysis is based on the idea that in a context of asymmetric information 
banks use real assets as a guarantee against project default. 
Although many papers have explained the relationships between the debt level 
and  the  value  of  real  assets,  empirical  evidence  is  mainly  based  on  large 
“listed” firms. The question as to the whether these arguments are valid for 
smaller firms has received limited attention. One reason is that good data on 
smaller non-listed firms has not been available until very recently. Moreover, 
many papers focus on the credit rationing of high-tech firms because they have 
difficulty in borrowing long term and borrow at high spreads. Indeed, if a high 
tech project fails, there is no collateral to protect creditors. 
Many papers also show that specialized assets should fetch a low resale price. 
This  suggests  that  a  high resale  price corresponds to  a  highly  redeployable 
asset and that the reduction in resale value aggravates credit rationing, so that 
investment declines (see also Affuso (2006)). 
My purpose is to show empirically how the value of real assets explains credit 
rationing  of  unquoted  small  and  medium  firms.  It  is  interesting  to  analyze 
small and medium firms which, because of their ownership structure and size, 
have  fewer  financial  options.  Large  firms  can  obtain  credit  on  the  public 
markets while small firms depend on financial intermediaries. This implies that 
their main source of funds is banks. These firms are more likely to face credit 
rationing or a very high cost of non collateralized debt because banks resolve 
asymmetric  information  by  charging  higher  interest  rates  or  collateral 
requirement on small firms. 
Although my work is close to other papers on capital structure, my perspective 
on the problem is slightly different. I consider the relationship between credit 
rationing and firms' capital structure, rather than the relationship between debt 
ratio and firms' capital structure. 
In Section 2, I review some of the most relevant studies on capital structure. In 
Section  3, I present data and variables. In Section  4, I discuss the model. In 






Many  papers  have  explained  that  bank  financing  depends  on  whether  the 
lending can be secured by tangible assets (Storey (1994) and Berger and Udell   4
(1998)). Moreover, from the literature emerges that several characteristics of a 
firm  affect  the  level  of  indebtedness.  In  my  paper,  I  use  many  of  these 
characteristics  as  independent  variables  to  explain  credit  rationing.  In  this 
Section I present some works that underline how the used variables are linked 
to the firm's debt level. 
Titman (1984) suggests that firms manufacturing machines and equipment are 
financed  with  relatively  less  debt  because  they  find  liquidation  especially 
costly. Indeed, when assets are highly specialized, their value to the firm is 
greater than their value to the marketplace. Firms with unique or specialized 
products therefore have relatively low debt ratios. 
Leeth and Scott (1989) reject the hypothesis that the theories of secured debt 
wrongly predict collateralization, and demonstrate that collateral reduces net 
borrowing costs. Their analysis shows that the incidence of secured debt is 
strongly related to default probability, loan size, loan maturity, marketability of 
assets, economic conditions and legal framework. 
Rajan and Zingales (1994) also demonstrate that leverage increases with fixed 
assets, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities and firm size and decreases 
with  volatility,  advertising  expenditure,  bankruptcy  probability,  profitability 
and  uniqueness  of  the  product.  Rajan  and  Zingales  focus  on  four  factors: 
tangibility of assets, the market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. If a 
large  fraction  of  a  firm's  assets  are  tangible,  then  assets  should  serve  as 
collateral diminishing the risk of the lender. They should also retain more value 
in liquidation. Therefore, the greater the proportion of tangible assets on the 
balance sheet, the more willing should lenders be to supply loans and the lower 
rationing should be. 
Johnson (1997), analyzing the composition of debt, finds that firms with access 
to public debt markets use little bank debt, but borrow a substantial proportion 
of  their  debt  from  private  non-bank  lenders.  Moreover,  he  finds  a  positive 
relationship between bank debt use and fixed asset ratio for firms with access 
as well as for firms without access to public debt markets. 
Guiso  (1998),  in  his  analysis  on  high  tech  Italian  firms,  shows  that  the 
probability that a high tech firm is credit-constrained does not depend on the 
amount of collateralizable assets but on the level and composition of firms' 
liabilities.  Indeed,  a  large  share  of  short-term  liabilities  increases  credit 
rationing. 
Cassar and Holmes (2003), studying the determinants of capital structure show 
the differences between long and short forms of debt and underline that given 
the high proportion of short debt in the firms, overall leverage is negatively 
related to fixed assets, but long term debt structure is positively related to long 
term asset structure. 
An important determinant of capital structure is also the past profitability of the 
firm. Profitable firms which have access to retained profits use these for firm 
financing rather than accessing outside sources. 
At the same time, a rationed firm has a lower level of profitability because   5
when a firm is rationed it is excluded from the market, so it obtains a lower 
level  of  capital  for  investment.  Rationed  firms  have  a  lower  predicted 
performance. 
Rajan and Zingales (1994) show that the correlation between the leverage of 
larger firms with profitability is more negative than the correlation between 
small firms and profitability. 
Another  important  element  is  the  firm's  age  because  it  is  a  reputational 
mechanism  (Diamond,  1989).  Reputation  allows  borrowers  to  obtain  better 
cotract conditions and thus have more debt in their capital structure. 
The literature also frequently finds a good predictor of difficulty in obtaining 
credit is firm size. 
From Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1987), several papers show that capital-
market  imperfections  limit  the  availability  of  external  finance  to  small  and 
young firms. Particularly for smaller firms, any contraction in earnings reduces 
their total finance because they cannot easily increase their external finance. 
In fact, bank credit rationing is less likely among “large” firms because they 
can more easily raise funds directly on the market, and because large firms are 
thought to be able to offer better collateral because their quality is clearer to 
financial intermediaries. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) underline how size can be viewed as a proxy of the 
probability of default. Larger firms are generally more diversified and have less 
probability of going bankrupt. 
In Rajan and Zingales (1994) the effect of firm size on leverage is ambiguous. 
Larger firms tend to be more diversified and fail less often, so size may be an 
inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. However size may also be a 
proxy for the information outside investors have, which should increase their 
preference for equity relative to debt. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) have recently shown that small 
firms are significantly and negatively affected by financing obstacles: collateral 
requirement, bureaucracy, high interest rates, the need for special connections 





I  use  the  Capitalia  database  containing  data  on  a  sample  of  Italian 
manufacturing firms. I use two samples, one for the period 1995-1997, and one 
for the period 1998-2000. 
The samples were stratified according to size, industry and location and thus 
constitute a statistically significant representation of the Italian manufacturing 
industry. The database includes almost 500 variables; it provides information 
on balance sheet items, including assets, liabilities and their composition, as 
well  as  information  such  as  ownership  structure,  availability  of  external 
finance, and entitlement to public subsidies.   6
The  panel  I  analyze  includes  all  those  firms  which  were  present  in  the 
database for the whole period 1995-2000. From the total sample I exclude the 
firms that have missing values for all the variables included in my analysis. 
Small  firms  with  less  than  50  employees  represent  60  percent  of  the 
observations, firms between 50 and 500 are 38 percent, and firms with more 
than 500 employees are 2 percent. To avoid problems with outliers this last 
category of firms was excluded. 
I therefore consider 1209 firms corresponding to 5791 observations. 
I assume that a firm is credit rationed if its answer to whether, at the current 




The dependent variable (RATION) I use in my analysis is the binary variable 
representing rationed firms. I use this factor to test the idea that credit rationing 
can be the rational response of the bank system to asymmetric information. As 
independent  variables  I  use  indicators  of  profitability,  productivity,  capital 
structure, bank indebtedness and geographical localization. 
What  I  want  to  verify  in  my  paper  is  whether  fixed  assets  have  a  role  in 
diminishing  credit  rationing  for  Italian  small  firms.  So  the  most  important 
variable in my analysis is RASSET, the share of fixed assets on total assets. As 
in  Johnson  (1997)  I  use  it  as  a  proxy  for  asset  collateral  value.  In  fact, 
tangibility eases the availability of debt and improves the terms on which debt 
is available. 
The collateral value of fixed assets depends directly on the liquidation value, so 
it is possible to use this measure as a proxy for project liquidation values. 
Because leverage is positively associated with liquidation value (Harris and 
Raviv 1990), liquidation value is negatively linked with credit rationing. 
Another measure of collateral is the share of long term financial assets on total 
assets (LTF). 
STF measures the ratio between short term financial assets, financial assets of 
less  than  one  year  maturity,  and  total  assets.  The  market  for  short  term 
financial assets is characterized by a great degree of “openess” in terms of the 
securitization of assets, so it may be considered another proxy for collateral. 
Profitability is measured by the ratio of gross operating surplus on total sales 
(GOSSALES), while productivity is measured by the effect of sales per worker 
(SALWORK). 
BANKLEV is the total bank debt of the firm divided by total liabilities. I use 
this variable because this type of financing is important to SMEs. 
There are two geographical dummies to show geographical differences in Italy, 
DUMNORTH, for the North, and DUMSOUTH for the South. 
The regressor AGE, which approximates the firm's reputation (Diamond 1989), 
is measured from the firm's year of foundation. 
Several papers show that capital-market imperfections limit the availability of   7
external finance for small firms, so in order to consider firm size I introduce a 
dummy (DUMSMALL) which is 1 for firms with less than 50 workers, and 0 
otherwise.  
PAVITT3  is  a  dummy  which  identifies  the  prevalent  activity  sector  among 
Specialized Sectors (Pavitt=3). I choose this because Leeth and Scott(1989) 
argue that the liquidation value of assets, and consequently their suitability as 





I test if fixed assets affect banks' rationing behavior. Following Guiso (1997), I 
assume that the decision to grant or refuse credit depends on a set of observable 
characteristics  of  the  firm,  identified  by  the vector  it X ,  where  the  index  i 
refers to the firm and t to the year. 
The  bank  observes  the  value  of  X   and  on  the  basis  of  the  observed 
characteristics infers the quality of the firm.  X  includes only variables that can 
be observed, such as publicly available information, like firm characteristics 
and published balance sheet information. 
Let 
*
it P  be the variable for the bank decision whether to finance firm i or not. I 
assume that 
*
it P  depends linearly on  X :  
 
  it it it u X P + b =
*   (1) 
 
where  b  is a vector of coefficients and  it u  an error term. 
*
it P  is a dummy 
variable which takes value 1 if firm  i is credit-constrained and  0 otherwise. 
So:  
 
  0) > ( = 1) = (
*
it it P prob P prob   (2) 
  
Assuming that  it u  is normally distributed, the vectors of parameters  b  can be 
estimated by maximum likelihood technique. 
In my probit estimates, I use the Random-Effect model. The idea of the random 
effect model is to consider individual effects as latent random variables. When 
N   is  large  and  the  sampling  is  truly  representative  of  the  population,  the 
hypothesis underlying the RE model are satisfied. 
For the random-effects model, the likelihood is expressed as an integral which 
is  computed  using  Gauss-Hermite  quadrature.  I  check  the  quadrature 
approximation  used  in  the  random-effects  estimators  and  I  choose  the 
quadrature points for which the coefficients do not significantly change. The 
level I choose is 24. In fact, at a high number of points (greater than 20), the   8
results  were  more  stable.  Although  the  size  of  the  coefficients  varied 
according to the number of quadrature points, the findings were similar and the 
interpretation  of  the  results  did  not  change  according  to  the  number  of 





Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the model, their sample 
mean, standard deviation and number of independent observations. 
An examination of the correlation matrix of the sample data (Table 2) shows a 
critical value between RASSET and STF, but it should be noted that the large 
positive correlation may be caused by their common denominators (Titman and 
Wessels 1988). 
Moreover,  Long  (1997)  argues  that  if  independent  variables  are  highly 
collinear,  a larger  sample  is  required.  He  thus suggests that  is  risky  to use 
maximum likelihood estimators with samples smaller than 100, while samples 
over 500 seem adequate. He claims that a rule of at least 10 observations per 
parameter is reasonable, even though this does not imply that a minimum of 
100  is  needed.  My  sample  is  large  enough  in  order  to  satisfy  the  above 
conditions. 
Multicollinearity  is  a problem  for  separation  of  the  effects  of  two  or  more 
variables  on  an  outcome  variable.  The  problem  occurs  when  independent 
variables are more highly correlated with each other than they are with the 
dependent  variable.  As  the  independent  variables  become  more  highly 
correlated, it becomes more and more difficult to determine which variable is 
actually producing the effect on the dependent variable. 
The Variance-Inflation Factor (VIF) shows us how much the variance of the 
coefficient  estimate  is  being  inflated  by  multicollinearity.  Typically,  the 
threshold of VIF at which we consider multicollinarity to be a problem is 10 
for each variable and is 6 for mean VIF. From my analysis, the singular VIFs 
are not higher than 1.9 and mean VIF is 1.28.  Results of probit regression 
relating credit rationing to firm characteristics are in Table 3. 
From  the  output  of  estimation,  we  can  see  that  the  Wald  test  rejects  the 
hypothesis that all of the coefficients except the intercept are simultaneously 
equal to zero. 
Analyzing the effects of the variables we can see that the effect of sales per 
worker is negative and strongly significant while gross operating surplus as a 
share of total sales has a positive but not statistically significant effect. This 
positive sign confirms, although not statistically, the pecking order theory that 
firms prefer internal to external financing (Myers, 1984, and Myers and Majluf, 
1984). 
Bank indebtness strongly affects the probability of being rationed. It means that 
indebted firms have more difficulties in obtaining other funds.   9
The measures of collateral negatively affect the probability of a firm being 
denied credit. In fact, the share of long term financial and real assets of total 
assets both have a negative and significant effect. In this case, the positive 
incentive effect of collateral requirement prevails over the negative selection 
effect (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Short term financial assets also have a negative and significant effect. 
Moreover, the probability that a firm will be rationed does not depend on its 
location. Firms in the South are not more rationed than firms in the North. 
The analysis of the regressor firm's age, measured from its year of foundation, 
shows  that  it  is  negative.  This  is  consistent  with  the  argument  that  the 
reputational capital of older firms reduces credit constrain, but this effect is not 
statistically significative. 
The  firm  size  dummy  does  not  signal  a  high  difficulty  of  small  firms  in 
obtaining credit. 
 
I also compute the Marginal Effects at the sample means of the variables to 
gain an impression of the magnitudes of the changes in the probability of being 
rationed.  The  computation  of  the  marginal  effects  at  the  sample  means  is 
shown in Table 6. The estimates show how the probability of being denied 
credit changes when the variables move from zero to their mean value. 
When the variable RASSET changes from zero to its mean, the probability of 
being  denied  credit  decreases  2.7  times.  These  results  are  consistent  with 





The findings of the paper suggest that real assets are important in diminishing a 
firm's credit rationing. 
The idea I test is that firms with more tangible assets have higher debt levels, 
particularly when loans are collateralized. 
In the analysis I assume that the decision to grant or refuse credit depends on a 
set of observable characteristics of the firm. 
I find that collateral is negatively correlated to rationing. 
In fact, measures of collateral negatively affect the probability of a firm being 
denied credit; the shares of long term financial and of real assets of total assets 
both have a negative and significant effect. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 
RASSET  0.235  0.149  0  0.912  5855 
STF  0.523  0.162  0.001  1  5855 
LTF  0.034  0.067  0  0.928  5855 
BANKLEV  0.178  0.177  0  0.737  5855 
AGE  24.596  18.064  0  146  6249 
GOSSALES  0.105  0.078  -1.03  1.333  5839 
SALWORK  286.590  377.943  0  15730.6  6291 
WORKERS  62.681  81.510  1  500  6306 
 
   
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
   RASSET  STF  LTF  BANKLEV  AGE  GOSSALES  SALWORK  DUMSOUTH  DUMNORTH  DUMSMALL  PAVITT3 
RASSET  1                     
STF  0.590  1                   
LTF  0.252  0.297  1                 
BANKLEV  -0.042  0.026  -0.056  1               
AGE  0.187  0.240  0.065  -0.064  1             
GOSSALES  -0.245  -0.201  -0.076  0.051  -0.126  1           
SALWORK  0.132  -0.025  0.049  -0.197  0.125  -0.149  1         
DUMSOUTH  -0.053  0.005  0.086  0.217  -0.180  0.018  0.127  1       
DUMNORTH  -0.002  -0.096  -0.002  0.153  -0.302  -0.074  0.099  0.589  1     
DUMSMALL  0.169  0.121  0.289  0.257  0.179  -0.071  -0.094  0.155  0.128  1   
PAVITT3  -0.001  -0.019  -0.020  0.070  -0.031  -0.055  0.140  0.040  -0.038  -0.136  1 Table 3: Probit Estimates 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error.  z  p>IzI 
RASSET  -0.8925  0.4174  -2.14  0.032 
STF  -0.8116  0.3849  -2.11  0.035 
LTF  -1.8088  1.0322  -1.75  0.080 
BANKLEV  0.7607  0.2569  2.96  0.003 
AGE  -0.0032  0.0033  -0.97  0.331 
GOSSALES  0.4700  0.5853  0.80  0.422 
SALWORK  -0.0008  0.0003  -2.94  0.003 
DUMSOUTH  0.1007  0.1713  0.59  0.557 
DUMNORTH  0.0364  0.1252  0.29  0.771 
DUMSMALL  0.0919  0.1047  0.88  0.380 
PAVITT3  -0.0558  0.1080  -0.52  0.605 
Cons  -7.1879  25.8671  -0.28  0.781 
         
Number of 
observations  5791       
Number of firms  1209       
Wald chi2(11)  21.32       
Prob>chi2  0.0302       
Log Likelihood  -1441.731          
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Table 4: Frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes 
  Predicted 
               D=0                                   D=1                                  Total 
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Table 5: Frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes 
  Predicted 
               D=0                                   D=1                                  Total 
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Table 6: Marginal Effects 
Variable  Coefficient 
RASSET  -0.027   
(0.012)** 
STF  -0.024    
(0.011)** 
LTF  -0.055   
(0.031)*** 
BANKLEV  0.023     
(0.007)* 
AGE  -0.000     
(0.000) 
GOSSALES  0.014         
(0.017) 
SALWORK  -0.000    
(0.000) 
DUMSOUTH  0.003      
(0.005) 
DUMNORTH  0.001      
(0.003) 
DUMSMALL  0.002       
(0.003) 
PAVITT3  -0.001     
(0.003) 
***,**,* represent significance at ten, five, and one 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: ATT Estimates 
  Nearest Neighbor  Kernel 
Estimate (ATT) 
t-value 
-0.038 
-2.488 
-0.025 
-2.104 
n. treated 
n.controls 
2270 
1250 
2270 
2716 
 